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Abstract 
Investigating how recent Privacy and Intrusion laws have changed to affect individual’s 
rights around the areas of terrorism, data retention and the recent Investigatory Powers Act. 
Accompanying this, research into how participants perceive storing personal sensitive data 
and whether this should be held by a specific authority is considered. This assessment on 
whether the public should have their information stored and investigated, with the aim to 
aid in the prevention/detection of serious crime and terrorism is needed. The necessity to 
find a balance between both privacy and intrusion is key in a society with expanding modern 
technologies. By analysing past legislation to show where the Government has misused its 
powers to find specific crimes will give an understanding on the next step to combatting 
threats against the nation, while also weighing in on how to combat the growing intrusion 
against ones privacy rights. The balance needed must ensure privacy, and the correct 






To my supervisors, Tom*1and Kos*2for all your help and support. To my father, Keith and 
step-mother, Mandy for encouraging me to continue in life regardless of the circumstances. 
To my friends; Jacob, Karl, the Sophie’s, and Skye for ensuring whenever I lost my path to 
get straight back onto it. I would also like to thank Canterbury Christ Church University for 
giving me the facilities to achieve my degree. 
                                                          
* Tom Mortimer (Director of Law, Criminal Justice & Computing, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK) 
* Dr Konstantinos Siliafis (Senior Lecturer in Law, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK) 





- Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
- Research Question 
- Research Objectives 
2 Literature Review 
- ‘Panic Stations: Surveillance in the UK’ 
- ‘UK Data Retention Regulations’ 
- ‘Access to Communications Data’ 
- ‘Data Retention in the UK: Pragmatic and Proportionate, or a step too far?’ 
- Conclusion 
3 Methodology 
- Historical Analysis 
- Black Letter Law 
- Socio-Legal Perspective 
- Alternative Methodologies 
- Study 
4 Previous Legislation and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
- Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
- Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 
- The Terrorism Order 2006 and 2009  
- The Counter Terrorism Act 2008 
- Draft Data Communications Bill 2012/The Snoopers’ Charter 
- Data Retention and the Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
- The Investigatory Powers Act 
- Conclusion 
5 Findings 
      - Results 
      - Future Studies 
      - Conclusion 
 
6 Conclusion and Recommendations  
- Research objectives 
- Alternative methodologies  
- Conclusion 
   
1 – Introduction 
The investigatory Powers Act 2016 is the newest piece of legislation regarding privacy and 
intrusion rights. The United Kingdom created this to counter the rise of terrorism threats over 
the last two decades. As terrorism has continued to grow the Government has implemented 
newer types of legislation to try to combat the threat and the modifications of the problems 
occurred through modern technology. This has been done to ensure society is protected from 
the threats. The problem is that the Government is trying to safeguard the public, by using 
their information to intercept criminal or terrorist activity and prevent any action. This is 
where the intrusion element comes into force, as individual’s information is being taken to 
try to counter the ongoing threats, while privacy rights are essential to ensure the protection 
of personal sensitive data.  
The proposals the Government implemented were to “investigate, prevent and supress 
terrorism”3, and has since been included to serious crime4. One of the first anti-terror laws5, 
had implications for privacy and intrusion based on the regulation of communications data.6 
This is due to powers within the Act that allow the Government to investigate any data they 
have on an individual, use it to counter crime/terrorism and keep the information until it is 
no longer needed. Privacy international has deemed this as an intrusive act against society, 
especially when those investigated may not have committed any crimes7. 
                                                          
3 European Council, ‘Declaration on Combating Terrorism’ [2014]  
4 One example, in response to September 11th was when the UK Parliament introduced the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime, and Security Act 2001 only two months after the attacks. 
5 Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
6 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 Pt 11 
7 Privacy International, ‘Mass Surveillance’ https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/52 accessed 
27/06/2017 
   
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act is one example where legislation has been 
reformed due to its incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights, as the 
Government acted unlawfully, abusing powers given by Parliament. The requirement to 
assess if the Investigatory Powers Act has found a balance between privacy and intrusion of 
information. Orwell explained through 1984 that he was concerned that the Government was 
becoming a dystopian surveillance state, as the balance between monitoring of individual 
information and maintaining privacy rights needs to be proportional8. 
Chapter three will explain the timeframe where legislation has been selected, and then 
reformed, specifically after the Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act 20009 to include; 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 200110, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 200511, 
and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 201612. The need to reform legislation is due 
to the further acts of terrorism that have occurred over the last 17 years. The difference here, 
is that in some cases of terrorism justifies why privacy laws are broken, in comparison to when 
the Government is misusing its powers13. 
 Another viewpoint is that with newer technological methods in the world, this creates newer 
ways for terrorism to occur. Although this questions why there is a need for privacy rights, as 
the Government are intruding upon personal sensitive information, all Acts being discussed 
only relate to invasion of privacy and intrusion when concerning serious crime and terrorism. 
Again, as newer terrorism is justified to break privacy laws, the difference the Government 
makes is that it uses powers presented for the purposes of terrorism, in non-terrorism related 
                                                          
8 George Orwell, ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’ (1st edn, Secker & Warburg 1949) 
9 Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
10 Anti-Terorrism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
11 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
12 Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
13 The attacks on 9/11 or the London tube bombings. 
   
cases. In previous cases and pieces of legislation the Government has misused its powers to 
investigate minor crimes against vulnerable individuals14, showing that the state have felt that 
in the past it has been warranted to break privacy rights to monitor specific people. However, 
when being reviewed it has come to light that this has in fact broken individual privacy rights. 
This dissertation will be reviewing how the Government extends its powers, and whether 
minor crimes are necessary to be monitored, as they normally fall out of the scope to warrant 
privacy rights to be intruded upon. Minor crimes should be excluded as they are not a strong 
enough justification to allow the privacy rights of the population to be waivered. As such, the 
UK Government have continuously amended, reformed, and updated legislation, to the 
creation of the current Investigatory Powers Act15. However, privacy and intrusion concerns 
have remained one of the biggest concerns, for whistle blowers, Members of Parliament and 
privacy activists. Edward Snowden reviewed the legislation to explain that “The UK has just 
legalised the most extreme surveillance in the history of western democracy. It goes further 
than many autocracies.”16 The media, and Snowden’s comments sparked concern amongst 
the UK population, leading to 212,743 individuals signing a petition asking for the 
Investigatory Powers Act to be repealed. Although this may not seem a lot in comparison to 
the entire population of the UK, it is when considering that a large proportion of individuals 
were not aware that this was occurring due to modern day concerns.17  
Another concern is that the Government has the authority to review its own agencies, rather 
than allow an independent organisation to review what actions are made. By having an 
independent organisation, rather than a Government agency to examine policy and cases 
                                                          
14 Young children 
15 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
16 Edward Snowden, '@Snowden' (Edward Snowden's Twitter Account, 17 November 
17 Brexit 
   
allows the correct process of misuses of powers and correct legislative review. This allows the 
transparency needed for such an important issue, privacy rights, as it allows an organisation 
to be held accountable. Whereas, the Government abusing powers, then assess whether they 
have used them correctly could be considered an injustice or biased verdict. This would lead 
to the idea that the Government is able to self-assess and give bias judgements to its own 
decisions. 
The Investigatory Powers Act has made it compulsory for Internet Service Providers to store 
an individual’s information for 12 months, which can then be viewed by the Government and 
its agencies to assess whether there is a potential or current threat to society and national 
security. Information can be taken from: mobile phones, computers, cameras, and the 
internet in order to build up profiles of individuals and the threats they pose. The issue for 
this dissertation is whether the Government and its agencies have too much power, set out 
within the Investigatory Powers Act, which allows them to view personal sensitive data. The 
element of intrusion is based on the Government effectively branding all of society as 
potential threats, rather than only looking at known criminals or terrorists and known 
associates. Although this does enable a higher chance of deterring and countering threats, 
the fear that the UK Government is creating an ‘Orwellian’ style state where all individuals 





   
Research Question 
The purpose of this dissertation is to establish whether the Investigatory Powers Act has 
balanced the argument between privacy and intrusion rights, or whether this has not been 
met, similarly to previous legislation. This will be established by looking at privacy and 
intrusion and how the Government has used its powers in the past, and then give an 
understanding on the new law. By investigating how critics and academics review privacy, 
combined with the study being conducted within this dissertation will be able to assist with 
understanding if the balance has been met. It is necessary to assess individual rights in a world 
that is becoming further modernized through technology, while also acknowledging the 
concern that fear is growing not only amongst the society in the United Kingdom, but all over 
the world. Information needs to be private, and the idea that criminal action could be causing 
this to be mistreated and used needs to be reassessed to ensure individuals personal sensitive 
information is being managed appropriately.  
The Government intrudes upon privacy rights by monitoring individual information, one 
example being TalkTalk, who had information taken, due to a cyber-breach. Information such 
as; pornography, political and religious sites, health-focused websites, and pirate sites were 
all taken from TalkTalk’s database showing the need for an individual’s activity to be private. 
This is one of six of the largest databases in the UK18, and if criminals can access these storage 
facilities, this could amount to mass information of individuals being misused, and the 
                                                          
18 Claire Walker, ‘Computer Law & Security Review’ [2009] 25(4) Data retention in the UK: Pragmatic and 
proportionate, or a step too far? Pg 325-334 
   
identification of individuals. Therefore, there is a need to establish a balance between privacy 
and intrusion19 is necessary to protect individuals.  
Research Objectives 
Several objectives will be reviewed within this dissertation, as several further observations 
regarding the initial research question. This will be establishing whether there is a balanced: 
keeping or showing a balance; in good proportions or taking everything into account; fairly 
judged or presented between privacy and intrusion. The objectives aimed to be answered 
include whether: 
- The Government has misused/abused powers given to collect information? 
- Reform is needed within the current system in place to allow an independent 
organisation to have control over powers? 
- Minor crimes should be monitored? 
The need to view the definition of the term balanced will help understand what is being 
investigated. Therefore, intrusion and privacy rights need to find a balance where both are 
proportionate and not outweighing the other. Although the Government has given it powers 
to allow information to be stored, privacy has been breached in the past, and the concern 
that this will again reappear needs to be assessed to consider whether there is a need for 
reform. 
By also assessing whether individuals find minor crimes need to be reviewed would be able 
to give clarity on the previous use of powers. The European Convention of Human Rights has 
                                                          
19 Chris Johnston, ‘TalkTalk customer data at risk after cyber-attack on company website’ The Guardian [2015] 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/22/talktalk-customer-data-hackers-website-credit-card-
details-attack accessed 03/06/17 
   
currently deemed legislation to be unlawful, and if the Government is collecting information 
on a large scale, which allows the identification of individuals this will again be unlawful. This 
will be how intrusion and privacy play its part, as the potential abuse of powers is leading to 
the Government becoming a dystopian surveillance state, presented by Orwell is the need to 
look and assess the research question and objectives. 
Privacy 
This dissertation views privacy as: the state of being free from the public attention – or the 
ability to act in a manner that will not be shared and noticed by society or the Government20. 
The Human Rights Act define privacy as:21 the right to live your life with privacy, and without 
the interference by the state on matters of: sexuality, body, personal identity, relationships, 
and personal information22. For the purposes of this dissertation both definitions are key, as 
both hold a different context socially and legally.  
Privacy activists are concerned that individuals are having limited privacy rights. As an 
example, individuals who use social media have a mass amount of data collected on them23. 
With other half of individuals accessing the internet at least once monthly, the concern that 
the Government can monitor information of individuals, and that the balance of privacy and 
intrusion needs to be readdressed to ensure data is not misused. Originally, the creation of 
the camera sparked the first concern over “The Right to Privacy”24 as society became fearful 
that the new technology of the time could capture someone’s image and storing it. 
                                                          
20 James Murray, Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press 2010)  
21 Human Rights Act 1998 Art 8 
22 Ibid  
23 https://www.emarketer.com/Article/More-Than-Half-of-UK-Population-Will-Log-on-Facebook-This-
Year/1013627  
24 Warren, Brandeis, ‘Harvard Law Review’ [1890] 4(5) The Right To Privacy 
   
A second example would be with the use of postcards, as a cheaper alternative to letters but 
with the knowledge that anything written could be read by another. Returning to the modern 
day, the concern now resides with mobile phones, computers, closed-circuit television25 and 
the internet as the newest forms of technology that have information stored. Technologies 
have adapted and evolved so much in relation to terrorism that the Government continues 
to add more legislation to try to counter and deter new crime. The recent Investigatory 
Powers Act, has sparked concern that the privacy lives of individuals are going to be intruded 
upon by the Government by having data collected and used.  
Returning to the research question and objectives, it is arguable that the Government should 
not have access to the amount of information they are currently able to monitor26. The data 
that can be viewed was intended for one person, and as such to take and store this 
information intrudes and violates privacy rights, especially when the Government, has in the 
past, misused powers, and its authority to target minor crimes. It is arguable that taking 
societies information to find criminal activity shows an unbalanced framework between 
individuals privacy rights and the intrusion used by the Government, showing the need to 
assess whether the system needs reforming. 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 is an example where the Government were 
considered to be unlawful when “suspected international terrorists”27 were indefinitely 
detained within Belmarsh Prison28 under Part 4 of the Act29. The European Court on Human 
Rights found the UK to be acting unlawfully, while derogating away from the Human Rights 
                                                          
25 CCTV 
26 Echevarria, Morales et al, ‘An E-government Interoperability Platform Supporting Personal Data Protection 
Regulations [2016] 19(2) CLEI Electronic Journal 
27 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Pt IV, s21 
28 A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 2004 UKHL 56 
29 ACTSA 
   
Act. This shows one example where the UK has been found to act unlawfully when concerning 
privacy rights, showing why it is necessary to investigate further privacy cases that regard 
newer technology – as it has yet to be completely reviewed. 
The concern within this dissertation is how privacy’s role is impacting in a society that is 
constantly being monitored. The argument that individual privacy rights are being intruded 
upon to attempt to protect the interests of the nation needs to be assessed to find the balance 
between the need to monitor information, while allowing individuals to have their privacy 
rights. Most people do not commit a serious criminal action, bringing into question why the 
Government justifies the storage and usage of information. Currently, this could be due to 
the fear element being portrayed by media officials30. As the trend of terrorism grows, the 
concern that harm will occur gives the Government some authority to allowing information 
to be used.  
Within the legislation being used, all consider monitoring and investigating individuals 
proportionate when trying to counter/deter/prevent serious crime and terrorist actions. 
However, the legislation does not state this with minor crimes, as they may not be 
proportionate enough to intrude upon the privacy rights of individuals. One example, In Poole 
shows how legislative powers were used to assess whether children were in the correct school 
catchment area. This shows the Government violating the privacy rights of 
children/vulnerable individuals because of a school catchment area. This is not the purpose 
of legislation as this is not a serious crime, and as such has intruded the privacy lives of 
individuals, not warranting a proportionate justification for the invasion of privacy. The fear 
that does show is the Government’s ability to access the privacy lives of individuals, and take 
                                                          
30 Custers et al, ‘Fear effects by the media’ [2012] 171(4) European Journal of Pediatrics  
   
information regardless of a need for a crime/terrorist action. Steve Saxby promotes the idea 
that privacy and individual’s information being protected “is no longer adequate in a world 
where data flows across national boundaries”.31 The information age that society is in no 
longer regards the privacy rights of individuals. With the Government harvesting information 
on social media, with the ability to access messages and any information they require shows 
the need for privacy. As the internet especially has no boundaries between states, meaning 
information can be accessed not only by the UK Government, but anyone in the world. 
With the rise of cyber security threats online, the need to keep data and information correctly 
stored ensures that there is not a breach in privacy. The National Health Service32 is one 
example of how individual’s information was attacked and intruded on, showing the need for 
more security and privacy rights when concerning the personal sensitive data of individuals. 
in contrast, an idea that the Government should have limited information of society springs 
to mind, as this could ensure the balance between privacy and intrusion is met. This is done 
by limiting Government access, which is what cyber-attackers are looking for, big databases 
harnessing mass information. By doing this, means that the privacy of individuals is intact, 
while removing the possibility of personal sensitive data, such as the National Health Services’ 
database – as individuals hold their own information, rather than relying on the Government.  
 
                                                          
31 Steve Saxby, 'Computer Law & Security Review' [2013] 29(1) The 2012 CLSR-LSPI seminar on privacy, data 
protection & cyber-security - Presented at the 7th international conference on Legal, Security and Privacy 
Issues in IT law (LSPI) October 2-4, 2012, Athens 4-12 
32 Chris Holder, ‘Computer Law & Security Review’ [2016] 32(4) Robotics and law: Key legal and regulatory 
implications of the robotics age (Part II of II) pg 557-576; Robert Booth, ‘Cyber-Attack Set To Escalate As 
Working Week Begins, Experts Warn’ The Guardian (2017) 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/14/cyber-attack-escalate-working-week-begins-experts-
nhs-europol-warn accessed 18 May 2017 
   
Intrusion 
When discussing intrusion, the act of deliberately putting oneself into a place or situation 
where one is unwelcomed or uninvited that affects the privacy of an individual. Although the 
dictionary holds one perspective33, the Human Rights Act, this includes the unnecessary 
intrusion into an individual’s life34. By having both, again shows the legal and social aspects to 
assess how the Government is intruding upon society for the purposes of national security. 
The Orwellian state is a theme that is continuously mentioned throughout the reading of 
articles and journals. The fear that Orwell presented in 1984, where the super state monitors 
all of society and invades the minds of individuals, carried out by the “thought police” who 
look for “thought crime” using two-way television screens. Although Orwell believed when 
writing that super states would begin in 1984, the idea that he may have been in the wrong 
time period, as 15 years later there is a concern amongst privacy activists35 who feel their 
rights are being ignored. This shows that there a worry around the UK becoming like 1984, 
and the comparisons between privacy rights, although largely different – could become 
similar over the next few years if the Government fail to address privacy concerns. 
 Orwell’s view was that “On one side there are civil liberties groups demanding increased 
privacy and transparency; on the other there are ‘securocrats’ and law enforcement 
spokesmen, under pressure to keep us safe and facing a bewildering array of security threats, 
insisting they need to monitor more of our online behaviour… The debate is lurching whether 
to opt for a dystopia state, where our every move is secretly monitored, recorded and 
                                                          
33 James Murray, Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press 2010)  
https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=privacy&oq=privacy&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i61j69i65l2j69i61j0.1652j0j7
&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#q=privacy+definition  
34 Human Rights Act Art 8 
35 Amnesty International 
   
analysed, or a world where criminals are able to do what they like.”36 Both sides are inspired 
by fear, and as such most of the public find it difficult to establish technology37, and find law 
enforcement fragmented and opaque. As such, intelligence can be harvested and distributed 
in ways found to be unlawful. This was originally shown in the Edward Snowden sagas, and 
due to the disclosure threats being deemed too specified, has been kept secret from society. 
Politicians have tried to cover this with the informed debate of “unprecedented threats to our 
society” and the “snoopers charter”38. 
MP’s are questioning the Government on why certain agencies are allowed access to powers 
within the Investigatory Powers Act, as it is allowing access to a mass amount of data and an 
individual’s privacy. Two examples being the Food Standards Agency and the Gambling 
Commission. MP’s39 have questioned why such power has been given to agencies and 
whether they need that power. This then raises concerns on who should be able to add and 
remove agencies who are able to use legislative power, and if the current agencies should be 
on the list, as privacy rights have been breached by some in the past. Poole council is an 
example of privacy continuously being intruded on40.  
When using Phones and the internet as an example, the initial thought is that both are being 
increasingly used in the world41. The amount of information that can be extracted and stored 
                                                          
36 J Barlett, Orwell v Terrorists [2015] 
37 Castro & Mcquinn, ‘The Privacy Panic Cycle: A Guide to Pulic Fears About New Technologies’ [2015] 
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation 
38 Burgess, ‘What is the IP Act and how will it affect you?’ http://www.wired.co.uk/article/ip-bill-law-details-
passed Accessed 12 June 2017 
39 David Davis; Tom Watson; Andy Burnham; Jenny Jones (few MPs questioning the powers of the Act) 
40 Astrup, ‘RIPA Powers only used by Poole council twice since 2009 after spying outrage’ [2016] 
http://www.bournemouthecho.co.uk/news/14183694.RIPA_powers_only_used_by_Poole_council_twice_sinc
e_2009_after_spying_outage/ Accessed 12 June 
41 Suhang et al, ‘Impact of Excessive Mobile Phone Usage on Human’ [2016], Human. J Comput Sci Syst Biol  
   
from: texts, call history, browser history use, and social media42 has amplified so much due to 
the use of data on the move and with the advancement of the information age showing that 
although the extraction methods have enlarged, the duration of use has also increased. This 
shows why the Government is using the information gathered, to deter crime and terrorism, 
due to the mass amount collected43. The Government have tried to ensure that privacy and 
intrusion is balanced, on the basis that national security is being maintained, while trying to 
keep individual privacy rights, and the correct approach when deterring these threats. 
However, the UK legislation that was previously in force was considered as; illegal, lacking 
proportionate review, and incompatible with the Human Rights Act44 as minor crimes are 
being monitored. Therefore, the need to assess whether the Government is using its powers 
correctly, for serious crime and terrorism, instead of intruding upon rights is necessary to 
establish whether the balance has been met in new legislation. 
Max Schrem is one example of data being stored and used, which the Government could 
potentially access45. The access rights they have could identify individuals, which has been 
proven in cases related to journalists46 and whistle blowers shows that due to the amount of 
information available today, individuals are easily identifiable, which shows a big invasion of 
privacy rights.  Schrem found 1000 pages of information about himself on one social media 
site which included; friend requests, searches, and deleted members on his account. This 
shows just how much information is collected about one individual on one site. When relating 
this back to intrusion and privacy rights, the idea that the Government is able to access one 
                                                          
42 J Roberts et al, ‘The Invisible addiction: Cell-Phone activities and addiction among male and female college 
students’ [2014], Journal of Behavioural Addictions 
43 C Brown, ‘Investigating and Prosecuting Cyber Crime: Forensic Dependencies and Barriers to Justice’ [2015] 
International Journal of Cyber Criminology 9(1) 
44 Human Rights Act 1998 
45 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2015] Case C-362/14 
46 D Brennan, ‘Still a ‘Safe’ Harbor? – implications of Schrems v DPC’ (7)5 Data Protection Ireland  
   
of the largest data pools in the history of civilisation poses major privacy concerns, and that 
intruding upon an individual’s life is made easily accessible47. 
With the Government being able to access information whenever they require it shows just 
why intrusion of information and an individual’s private life needs to be assessed to see 
whether there can be a balance between both opposing sides. The record Schrem shows 
exactly why the need to find a balance between intrusion and privacy rights is a necessity 
today, as mass information is being collected and observed to try to counter crime. There is 
too much information that the Government can access, and identify one individual which 
breaks the right to privacy48. The Government does this by using legislative powers to find 
potential criminal behaviour, while also collecting data on individuals within society.  
The need to review previous legislation and assess where the Government and its agencies 
have gone beyond the proportionate and necessary and intruded into the privacy rights of 
society is needed. This will show if there are problems within the Investigatory Powers Act, 
how they can be reformed, to find the appropriate balance between privacy and intrusion. 
This relates back to the research question as the need to establish an appropriate balance is 
needed to ensure privacy for individuals is maintained, while also allowing intrusion rights for 
the purposes of national security. By assessing whether there is too much data on individuals 
will show that the Government is using its powers to try to investigate individuals that may 
not be committing crimes49. 
 
                                                          
47 K Rawlinson, ‘Snoopers’ Charter? That’s’s the least of your worries’ [2012] The Independent, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/snoopers-charter-thats-the-least-of-your-
worries-7854798.html Accessed 12 June  
48 ibid 
49 Ibid 
   
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
Chapter 4 will analyse the privacy and intrusion debate within the previous Acts needs to be 
reviewed to assess the abuse of power that has been shown already within the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act. Further privacy legislation needs to be reviewed, to 
consider whether the Government is abusing powers, which can be shown in the history of 
powers being used. By assessing this by using historical evidence of previous legislative 
failings, will show whether the Investigatory Powers Act addresses privacy concerns, as the 
balance between privacy and intrusion was previously unbalanced. Privacy within previous 
Acts has been breached, and within this dissertation further examples will show where the 
Government has gone beyond the necessary, while arguing for an independent organisation 
to take over and control the storage of information and the intrusion when necessary to deter 
crime.  
When looking at intrusion, the need to do this is for the purposes of serious crime and 
terrorism, which has been apparent since the Terrorism Act 2000. “interception of 
communications… and disclosure of data…, the use of covert human intelligence sources and 
the acquisition of… electronic data protected by encryptions or passwords… may be 
decrypted or accessed”50 shows what forms of information the Government initially began 
taking. 17 years later the possibility that more could be taken to deter individuals portraying 
elements of “serious violence against a person… creating a serious risk to the safety of the 
public… or… to seriously interfere or severely disrupt an electronic system.”51 The 
Government base this on “reasonable grounds for suspecting”52, giving its agencies the ability 
                                                          
50 Regulation of investigatory Powers Act 2000 
51 Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2009, Pt II 
52 Claire Macken, Counter-terrorism and the detention of suspected terrorists (1st edn, Routledge 2013) 
   
to: spy, track, and deter any potential criminals. This causes privacy concerns as the 
Government also are able to review individual information, and if they assess whether 
someone is potentially going to commit a crime and they are wrong, the Government 
agencies then have intruded upon an individual on an error.  
Therefore, the Investigatory Powers Act needs to be reviewed in the future by the 
Government if found that agencies are misusing the powers within the legislation. The idea 
originally of ensuring the protection of society is good, providing all individual’s information 
is protected, private, and will not criminalise them for minor crimes when the Act should be 
deterring serious crime and terrorism. The argument that the ‘greater good’ could be viewed 
here as a justifiable means, however by collecting mass data allows individuals to hack into 
the system and use the information maliciously. The greater good allows the risk of personal 
sensitive data to be breached, in order to protect the state. It is difficult to establish which 
one is better because it has not been confirmed how many crimes are stopped daily by 
abusing the privacy rights of individuals. Minor crimes are one focus that should not be 
reviewed as legislation has always tried to look at serious crimes and acts that could affect 
the nation, set out by the Crown Prosecution Service.  
 By looking at evidence from the past, with critical views and the views from the public should 
give an interpretation into the way the Government can progress, and not continue to brand 
all of society as potential criminals, when only a small quantity of individuals are causing 
serious threats/acts of terrorism. This relates back to the research question as there has 
previously been a breach of privacy for individuals, meaning the Government and the 
legislation has too much power over society, and the potential need to reform to enable 
individual’s to have the privacy rights they deserve. 
   
2 – Literature Review 
A literature review identifies, analyses, and evaluates work produced by researchers and 
scholars. For the purposes of this dissertation a multiple number of articles will be reviewed 
to show how a variety of researchers view privacy and intrusion in today’s world, to then 
assess whether there is a fair balance between intrusion and privacy. If there is not a fair 
balance, the process of assessing researchers views and recommendations then evidences 
why there is a need to identify the balance of individual privacy rights and the intrusion of 
rights to show a perspective from authors who are experts within aspects of privacy law. 
This would then meet the research question and objectives to show the misuse of power in 
the Government and the possible reforms necessary to ensure that further abuse of power 
is prevented.  
By looking at the aspects of privacy will also give further evidence to show that the balance 
between the right of privacy and whether the Government is being invasive towards personal 
sensitive information. The Government intrude information by extracting, and enhancing the 
knowledge it already has on its citizens. This will help evidence the previous and current issues 
within legislation, to provide an outcome to reform the balance of power between intrusion 
and privacy. 
‘Panic Stations: Surveillance in the UK’53 
Julian Petley reviews online activity in relation to terrorism laws, to show the decisions the 
Government makes out of fear and ignorance. He does this by comparing 1984 to the current 
state of online activity being controlled by the state, and that any activity is being monitored. 
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Petley discusses how the information age has made illegal activities such as paedophilia and 
terrorism more difficult, while also monitoring those not committing a crime. However, Petley 
goes further to explain that even newer technology has helped track individuals who are 
suspected of committing a crime.  
The Snoopers’ Charter was originally created before the Investigatory Powers Act, but did not 
become legislation. The disregard to Human Rights forced the Government at the time to 
abandon this, only to redraft the paper to become the Investigatory Powers Act. The 
legislation reviews “suspected terrorists, paedophiles or serious criminals”. After 
disagreements within the coalition, the proposed Bill was redrafted to ensure that the 
interpretation of legislation made by police and prosecutors was reviewed, enabling the 
Investigatory Powers Bill to be enacted. Petley returns to the first terrorist legislation, The 
Terrorism Act 2000, explaining that it is an offence to collect or make a record of information 
likely to be used to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism or to possess a 
document or record containing information of that kind. Petley reviews the downloading of 
the Al Qaeda Training Manual and even though in cases where the user was allowed to 
download this, for university or a theology based perspective, the police attempted to convict 
individuals for terrorism based offences.  
This shows that although individuals have lost their right to privacy, by researching a manual 
that can be found “on the website of WH Smith”54. This demonstrates how easily it is to access 
information that the Government perceived to be for terrorist purposes. This shows the 
intrusion of individuals rights as the Government has invaded their personal life, looked at 
the information individuals were researching, and prosecuting them. The fact the 
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Government are perceiving this as a potential criminal manual, yet allow individuals to buy 
this online brings forth the idea that the Government are not spending an effective amount 
of time reviewing what should be deemed as a crime or terrorist activity. 
One example of this is in 2008 when Rizwan Sabir, a Master’s student was arrested for 
downloading the manual, which was confirmed by his supervisors confirmed this, before 
being released 7 days later with no apology. The police continued to hold intelligence on Sabir, 
as he was convicted of a terrorist offence which was untrue. Due to; false imprisonment 
breaches, Human Rights violations, and data protection violations the police compensated 
Sabir £20,000. The violations Sabir received clearly shows an intrusion of an individual’s 
private and academic life – while also showing how the Government have too much power, 
even in 2008. 
Petley then reviews legislation that was previously drafted broadly and hastily, without 
proper attention to Human Rights. Petley does this by analysing individuals who have been 
criminalised for the first form of monitoring individuals, by looking at pictures that were taken 
and developed. One case involving the prosecution of Lawrence Chard, a photographer who 
took innocent pictures of his children in the family pool. Due to the police successfully 
prosecuting Chard, the magazine Amateur Photographer launched a campaign for common 
sense – aiming to help photographers that were being prosecuted around that time. A string 
of previous cases before 2000 emerged where parents took their innocent photo films of their 
children to pharmacies, only to be arrested for having “erotic posing” pictures of their children 
in the bath. Again, this was untrue and even though the term “erotic posing” was introduced 
to stop the kind of abuse, parents were still prosecuted. This shows how much power the 
Government had before 2000, and how the power they have remains in force, with the same 
   
power and invasive abuse of legislation. The balance between privacy of an individual’s 
private life and the intrusion that has happened is seriously unbalanced. 
Petley clearly shows that individual’s lives are intruded upon, before and during the period of 
time being reviewed, which damages an individual’s private life and image as legislative 
powers given to the Government and its agencies are abused. Although this looks at The 
Terrorism Act 2000 – this clearly shows a violation of individuals Human Rights, which Petley 
then makes a worryingly comparison to Orwell’s super state. This returns to the research 
question and confirms the concern regarding the balance between privacy and intrusion.  
 ‘UK Data Retention Regulations’55 
Richard Jones’ approach to reviewing data retention, the idea of storing information, by 
assessing how The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 200756 have impacted the UK. 
By showing the purpose of the Directive, to enforce communications companies to store 
information for the police and security services. Agencies can then conduct “investigations, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime”. Jones notes that due to this, retention of 
communication data is recognised as “valuable and important” as terrorist plots and serious 
crime have been deterred.  
Jones discusses how the UK then reviews retention of data, specifically looking at mobile 
phones and the internet. The new legislation is applying only to the public providers of 
electronic communications’ networks and services. Information asked to be retained 
includes calls (including unsuccessful attempts) and cell location for 12 months, with no 
maximum period for communications data to be retained. They are asked to remove the 
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data after one year, unless it is needed for billing purposes in the future. Although 
companies must enforce The Fifth Principle – the idea that once data is kept longer, 
information needs deleting, some companies need data to be stored for billing purposes. 
This means that although companies say they have to delete information after a year, this 
can in fact be longer as the information may still be necessary. Returning to the research 
question, this has implications on an individual as although their information is stored, this 
could be kept for longer than they once thought. This has privacy implications, more 
specifically when looking at potential cyber hacks. One problem clearly shown is there is no 
maximum restriction, and the company can keep information if they have an adequate 
reason for storing data is needed for further evidence. 
Data is revealed to security agencies when needing a specific case, which is reviewed on the 
principles of necessity and proportionality. The need to assess these two factors is based on 
trying to keep individuals information private, rather than broadcasting the data they want 
to remain isolated. The Working Party of data protection established under Article 29 of the 
EU Directive have criticised the Directive as being too lax in relation of private 
communications data, which Jones compares to the “similarly jaundiced view of the UK 
implementation.” This shows how Jones is making comparisons to the EU and UK’s response 
to privacy protection rights, meaning the need to update and reform this should be 
considered to ensure the data received does not become invaded and abused against. 
When relaying this back to the research question, this is a similar balance that needs to be 
assessed. The argument Jones makes is whether storing and using data is proportional to 
the crimes being committed, relating back to the research objective of whether this should 
be for serious crime and terrorism, or minor crimes. As a previous example, Poole was spied 
on for littering and dog-fouling. This brings forth what is proportional and necessary for 
   
deterring terrorism and serious crime, and to some this would be deemed as 
disproportionate. Therefore, Jones’ article relates to the need for privacy rights, in a world 
where anything is monitored, without justification.  
‘Snoopers’ Charter? That’s the least of your worries’57 
This article reviews one case, Max Schrem, before looking into police powers, internet users 
and companies. Kevin Rawlinson uses these combinations to analyse how data 
communication is affecting the UK Government, while showing several examples of how 
cyber hacking is influencing the need for new legislation. This relates back to the research 
question as this will indicate how intrusion affects society’s perspective, while also showing 
the need for privacy rights and individuals to have their own information, rather than the 
Government having sensitive data. 
Schrem has already been discussed, however he reports that “the scary thing was, with a 
simple ‘Ctrl+F’ search function on the computer, I could search for terms and key words. I 
found it was possible to build up a picture of who I am, what I like, who I might vote for.” 
This shows how a company can invade the rights of individuals for the purposes of 
marketing and building up a personal profile, especially on social media. There appears to 
be a need for privacy rights against a company, but the need to assess whether the 
Government having access to this is what needs to be reviewed.  
Rawlinson then looks at societies and companies legitimate and illegitimate uses against 
internet users. Two examples used include Google and Facebook that “feed off the data 
their users give them.” This is used for marketing, by accessing what individuals have been 
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searching for, which then is tailored to their requirements for a specific advertisement. 
Another form of using data includes cookies, which creates an online map of where users 
have been. This tracks individuals through their Internet Protocol address, which gives an 
indication on the user’s location. This relates back to the research question as the power 
companies such as Google and Facebook have the ability to record individual’s information, 
which can then be accessed by the Government. This relays back to how much power the 
Government currently has on companies and individuals, with the intention to gain access.  
As an example, Google has “one of the highest-profile sites when it comes to data 
collection” due to the “serendipity engine” that is being created. This is made by individual’s 
information being tailored specifically to the needs of the user. However, this needs 
personal data which is found through social media or marketing online. James Lyne, the 
director of technology strategy at Sophos explains that the services individuals show how 
information is “actually exposed” even when “speaking to a closed group of privileged 
friends”. This relates back to the Government having too much power. If the companies are 
able to harness and mine data as easily as they currently do, then Governments can access 
all data through the legislation that has been implemented.  
Google have also admitted inadvertently collecting sensitive personal data using software 
installed in cars. A further example by LinkedIn shows that 6.5 million passwords were 
leaked onto a hacker’s forum, indicating the level of concern regarding individual’s privacy 
rights, especially when coming to a social media site. This is because of the mass data able 
to mine, shown previously, while also considering that users will normally put personal 
sensitive information online about themselves. This could be; mother’s maiden names, pets 
and their names, their date of birth, the university/school they go to, pages they are 
   
interested in, email addresses and their friends. These are mostly secret questions when 
using an online site, and as Vicente Diaz explains, “once it gets this far, you have already lost 
control of your data.” Therefore, the need to have more individual privacy rights is 
necessary to ensure that further hacking, the very thing trying to be deterred, is stopped. 
The Government having access to information that has just been presented poses privacy 
rights of a different magnitude. By allowing the Government to have access to personal 
sensitive social media sites that has a mass amount of information shows the need for 
further privacy rights. By allowing companies to mine data, while then giving the 
Government the authority and power to access this poses severe violations of an 
individual’s rights. Having reviewed whether the Government should have access to these 
rights shows how privacy is unbalanced against the intrusion rights Governmental agencies 
currently have. 
‘Data Retention in the UK: Pragmatic and Proportionate, or a step too far?’58 
This article, presented by Claire Walker discusses the Data Retention Act 2009, which had 
just become enacted into power. This was the first time Internet Service Providers’ had to 
retain data, relating to customers email and internet usage on a compulsory basis, as 
opposed to voluntarily. This caused protest within private lobbying due to the concern over 
a “Big Brother” society, which then lead to Walker questioning policy backgrounds, practical 
implications for service providers and weighing up the argument between privacy and 
human rights concerns put forward to the Government. The way Walker examines how the 
Government acts in accordance with EU Data Retention Directive and the UK approach to 
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the regime shows the impact the Government has made on privacy rights for individuals. 
This is further evidence by Government cases and new Bills before concluding.  
Walker originally looks at how data retention in the UK has occurred, relating back to the 
idea that communications data for intelligence is mainly to counter terrorism purposes. This 
is shown within the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2001, highlighting the distinction 
between data retention and data preservation, subject to law enforcement authorities. 
Walker suggestions if there was already legislation in place, the events of terrorism – such 
as 9/11 would never have happened, and have acted as a catalyst for legislation that has 
been hastily introduced. Legislation such as the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 
which was the voluntary framework regime for retention of information of the telephone, 
email and internet data. The framework was finalised within 2004, agreed by service 
providers which was individually negotiated, including the reimbursement of certain costs 
by the Government. Here, this shows that the Government previously did not have enough 
power, possibly due to the lack of knowledge of terrorism at that period of time. When 
comparing that to now, where individual information is retained and users can sometimes 
be identified shows the transition of limited power to arguably too much power.  
Walker discusses who is subject to the new regulations at that time, indicating public 
communication providers would be responsible for making electronic communications 
accessible to agencies. The need to assess who is responsible is based on industry concerns 
over powers and who would be liable under ambiguous responsibility regulations. The 
outcome states that larger internet service providers would be, over communication service 
providers, with the aim for CSP’s to have “incremental” approaches to storing data built on 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act regime. This shows who has the power to retain 
   
data and communicate this to Government agencies. Data that can be stored and given out 
include data related to identifying subscribers and users through electronic 
communications. Other methods include data for billing purposes and identifying the 
location of a user. This shows what the Government and its agencies can currently identify, 
showing the breach of privacy in regards to knowing what an individual’s preferences are 
and their current location, sparking privacy concerns as users should not be identified or 
located. They need to remain anonymous, highlighting why the need to reiterate a balance 
between intrusion and privacy is necessary. 
The Government has brought to attention some potential reports that is worth noting, 
based on retention period, costs, sanctions and access of communications under legislation. 
By looking at these agendas set out, will show the Governments perspective of the 
implications they are willing to go to, to ensure national security is protected. This shows 
the argument the Government is presented with, when concerning individual privacy rights 
or intruding upon those rights in order to protect society as whole. 
The UK Regulations have imposed a flat 12 month storage of all data types, removing the 
previous provision of allowing the Home Secretary of being able to vary the retention period 
by notice. This shows that the Government have noticed how previous powers were too 
extreme, and they have refined this to make it fairer for privacy rights. The reimbursement 
of the amount spent to retain data, due to compliance with the Regulations, is conditional 
based on the notifications the Secretary of State’s agreements in advance and with 
compliance within audits. This shows that the Government is using money to fund the 
storage of data of individuals, without consulting whether society as a whole wants this to 
   
happen. Although this is for deterring serious crime and terrorism, individuals could argue 
that they are neither, and as such should not have their information stored.  
The sanctions imposed on communication service providers that fail to comply face civil 
proceedings for an injunction of specific performance of a statutory duty, giving a 
compelling reason due to the risk of consequences when failing to assist in matters of 
national security and serious crime. Again, this shows the Government having too much 
power over companies to comply, when ultimately it should be mandatory. The idea that 
companies are forced to store and give data over to the Government, when requested gives 
the impression of an Orwellian state again. The safeguards set out prevent the misuse of 
communications data and ensure access to information is proportionate. This does not state 
the measures in place, or whether there is a necessity to access information, indicating that 
the Government and its agencies if they believe information is proportionate and warranted 
for the purposes of dealing with serious crime and terrorism. The safeguards also do not 
show where the Government has extended its power to look at minor crimes, such as Poole 
where children were monitored and minor crimes were watched, rather than the more 
important issues that are justifiably more proportionate. 
Under Regulation 6, communication service providers must follow data protection principles 
to; ensure all data is equally secure and protected, with the same organisational measures 
(which includes accidental and unlawful destruction of data), enforce the idea that all data is 
subject to technical and organisational access through specially authorised personnel, and 
to ensure all data is destroyed to the end of use/ retention period of data. This shows that 
although the Government do have the power to access information, and have enforced the 
need for data retention, in reality it is difficult for access of information. This returns back to 
   
the objectives of whether they have too much power, and if this is intruding the lives of 
individuals carelessly. Here the Government have limited access rights and how agents gain 
information, while also showing a need to protect society as whole, indicating that although 
they have too much power, this is restricted because of the processes put in place. 
Access to communications data is restricted, designated by a telecommunications operator 
under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act to obtain and disclose information if they 
believe it is necessary and proportionate to counter terrorism and serious crime. This is 
based on a necessity test to “obtain… data if… necessary: (a) in the interests of national 
security; (b) for the purpose of preventing… crime or… disorder; (c) in the interests of the 
economic well-being of the UK; (d) in the interests of public safety; for the purpose of 
protecting public health; (f) for the purpose of assessing or collecting… tax, duty or levy or 
other imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government department; (g) for the 
purpose, in an emergency, of preventing death or injury or any damage a person’s physical 
or mental health;… (h) for any other purpose (not falling within paragraphs (a) to (g)) which 
is specified for the purposes of this section by an order made by the secretary of state”. This 
shows how the Government determines whether to access information. This does not show 
whether individuals follow the legislation or whether there is independent oversight. This 
returns back to the research question regarding the Government having too much power to 
be able to warrant using legislation that will invade the privacy rights of individuals.  
Those able to access data include police, the Serious Organised Crime Agency, the Scottish 
Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency, HM Revenue and Customs and the intelligence 
services. Statutory instrument has added other departments within the central 
Government, which have limited powers to accessing data. This has caused controversy with 
   
public and opposition concerns about the powers being compared to the “snooper’s 
charter”. The Government have responded to try to restrict the public authorities’ access 
further, by restricting which authorities can be granted within local authorities under the 
Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act.  
An authority must be able to balance “the extent of the intrusiveness of the interference 
with an individual’s right of respect for their private life against a specific benefit to the 
investigation or operation being undertaken by a relevant public authority in public interest” 
under the provisions of the Regulations of the Investigatory Powers Act. Although this code 
is not binding the courts will use this as a marker to establish whether authorities are being 
lawful and meeting the necessity and proportionality “thread” in order to make a successful 
application to acquire data. This refers back to the point of the dissertation, which questions 
whether the Government have too much power and if authorities are balancing privacy and 
intrusion. Walker shows that the authorities are trying to do this, to explain that accessing 
information is more difficult, but this does not necessarily mean data is private. This simply 
means the Government must jump through certain hopes in order to acquire what they 
desire. This shows that although the process of getting information has been reformed, the 
Government has still too much power as it can access the same amount, therefore the 
authorities have not found a balance.  
The need for independent oversight is clear, as Walker continues to explain that the 
Interception of Communications Commissioner carries out inspections of relevant public 
authorities and reports annually to Parliament. This is to assess legal compliance, and 
whether accessing data is effective. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal provides a further 
safeguard by hearing complaints by individuals relating to the Regulation of Investigatory 
   
Powers Act. Although this provides two organisations that are able to assess whether the 
Government are acting lawfully, through the publication of its findings. There is no clarity 
around how independent the organisations are, as they are still a branch within the 
Government Authorities, meaning the users of the Act are effectively reviewing themselves. 
Vienna University have found some areas that need highlighting; internet access, internet 
emails, spam, unsuccessful call attempts and blurring communications data and content. 
The Implementation Group have said they would attempt to reach a pragmatic stance on 
these problems, while understanding that there is still lots of work to do in relation to the 
handover of data and the retention of data. When internet access, not all forms generate 
User ID, examples being wireless LAN hotspots and unauthenticated dial up connections. 
This is similar to emails that have different types of protocols and records when identifying 
personal information. This ultimately depends on whether parties are customers to Service 
Providers. It is unclear whether spam is retained too, as 60% of emails are spam. This relates 
back to whether there is a need to retain personal information, especially spam, which holds 
no value to a users’ account. Call attempts within the context of webmail, are copied out of 
the Directive, yet hold no relation to Internet Service Providers.  
The evidence from the Government, as Walker states reviews the: proportionality and value 
of using data retention, the evidence gained from the 12 month of data, and access of data 
under the Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act regime. Walker then reviews the 
future UK policy to modernise the programme, the Communications Data Bill, and the latest 
proposals for decentralising data retention. This shows the opposing side to have data 
retention. Although understanding the need for privacy rights, this shows the initial reasons 
why the Government have approved data retention in the UK.  
   
Walker finishes by discussing the future of UK policies, through the use of the modernisation 
of programmes, the Communications Data Bill, and a decentralised data retention system. 
As the 2009 Regulations begin to stabilize within the statue book, the Government 
acknowledges the inadequacies for law enforcement, by launching a consultation to try to 
reform the first outlines in May 2008, which then were published in April 2009. The first 
policy stand begins with the Interception Modernisation Programme, outlining a strategy in 
2007-2008 to use “ground breaking technology to stay well ahead of the terrorists”. The 
Government have explained this is a necessity, and discussed the idea of a black box on all 
electronic communication for the GCHQ to investigate individuals. The promotion of this 
was based on a lower cost than implementing Internet Service Providers, while also showing 
the best way to centralise a database of information on individuals. However, this is clearly 
a privacy breach that would be opposed because the Government would be able to monitor, 
store and use data of an individual at any point. This returns back to Poole, when individuals 
were monitored. It is similar in the sense that even those who have not committed a crime 
would be monitored.  
The Communications Data Bill was discussed in 2008, with the intention to “allow 
communications data capabilities or the prevention and detection of crime and protection 
of national security to keep up with changing technology through providing for the collect 
and retention of such data, including data not required for the purposes of communication 
services providers”. This was to begin the possibility of a centralised database, which has 
raised concerns from the press, while questioning Parliament. This was based on the worry 
that recording all UK citizens’ mobile and internet records was “a step too far”. The Open 
Rights Group highlighted that this would mark a change under the Directive “where the 
Government can watch everybody”. The final version of the Bill appeared in 2009 before 
   
being rejected. This clearly shows the privacy concerns raised by companies and the media, 
raising the question of why the Government allowed agencies to have so much power. This 
then explains that the powers between privacy and intrusion were not balanced, which 
gives some indication to the current powers agencies have. 
The latest proposals Walker comments on finalises her article, explaining within the 
consultation document that “protecting the public in a changing communications 
environment” is necessary to deter terrorism and serious crime. The Government has 
suggested the legislation is limited in its effectiveness, and will continue to erode with the 
advancement of technology – meaning less communications will be meaningful to 
investigators. The Government have expressed that the centralization of data and the cost 
would be altered, meaning data will be fragmented and a reduced expenditure is met. This 
shows the Government altering its previous proposals to make the legislation user friendly, 
while ensuring service providers do not feel they are spending their money on systems to 
retain data. This relates back to the research question as the balance between privacy and 
intrusion is trying to be met by the Government. Therefore, previous legislation shows that 
intrusion of individuals privacy has occurred, which the Government is trying to amend in 
the future legislation. 
Conclusion 
The four articles reviewed discuss storage of information, communication access, and the 
legislation surrounding intrusion and the privacy rights of individuals. Each article took 
different approaches when analysing the balance of power, while also assessing whether 
the Government had too much power. From the evidence shown, clearly there is a divide 
between those legislating and the citizens of the UK, as both views on privacy and data 
   
storage are different. Although the Government deems it acceptable to use privacy powers 
to ensure the nation is protected as a whole, it could be considered that some individuals 
believe it is an abuse of powers to use their information, especially is they know it is not 
relatable to terrorism, to be used. The idea here is that individuals are happy to have the 
nation monitored, but not their own information when they believe that are not committing 
criminal actions. To monitor and review their everyday lives could lead to the assumption 
that they are being branded as a criminal or terrorist. 
The idea of Orwell’s 1984 has been reiterated several times throughout the articles, 
showing the concern amongst the future of privacy rights, as it would appear the “big 
brother” state is becoming more apparent. The next step to discuss is how the research for 
this dissertation was conducted, to try to further prove that the use and storage of data is 
becoming a threat to individual’s privacy rights. Although the Government have shown that 
this is to prevent serious crime and terrorism, the need to protect the personal sensitive 
data of individuals is still needed. By choosing to monitor society as a whole does not make 
intrusion of privacy rights justifiable.  
This relates back to the research question as the privacy of individuals and the intrusion put 
upon them has been explored within the texts. Clearly privacy is an aspect of people’s lives 
that they feel needs to be kept hidden, or secret away from the public’s view. The intrusion 
aspect shows that this hidden unexplored feature is essentially being attacked, and it would 
be considered not only an abuse of Human Rights, but of privacy rights of an individual 
(ethically, rather than legally) to have their hidden features exposed. Although privacy and 
intrusion are different sides of the spectrum, both are incredibly similar in the sense that 
each are topics of discussion, which will have room for debate. Intrusion has the aspects of 
   
the Government of protecting the nation, while also invading privacy rights, while an 
individual’s privacy is something to an individual that protects them from the nation (to an 
extent). To break the privacy rights protects a person from terrorism, while also allowing the 

















   
3 – Methodology 
Privacy, intrusion and the Investigatory Powers Act needs to be analysed. One method is by 
asking participants within a study to consider their own viewpoint around privacy and the 
possibility that their information can be accessed. The Investigatory Powers Act will not be 
questioned directly as individuals will not know the legislative power within the Act. By 
asking questions59 based on privacy and intrusion, will give an idea on their views, while also 
answering the research aims and objectives surrounding the Investigatory Powers Act 
without participants knowing legislation.  
The three methodologies found particularly useful for this study are the socio-legal 
perspective60, black letter law61, and a historical analysis62 to determine whether there is a 
balance between privacy and intrusion, while also questioning the Governments power. The 
three-combined offer both a quantitative63 and qualitative64 perspective on privacy and 
intrusion, with the aim to answer both research question and objectives. Each will be 
reviewed to show their relationship with privacy, intrusion, and the Investigatory Powers 
Act. The socio-legal perspective will be shown through the questionnaires that have been 
designed65 to ask students at Canterbury Christ Church University their opinion on privacy 
and intrusion, while the black letter and historic approaches will be found throughout the 
use of previous legislation. 
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Historical Analysis 
By looking at previous legislation will show where the Acts have been considered as: 
intrusive, unlawful, and incompatible with Convention Rights. As already shown, the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act has been incompatible. This should show the privacy 
concerns around the Investigatory Powers Act, to consider whether this new law will be just 
as unlawful as its predecessors, or whether privacy rights have been rectified. 
By using 2000-2017 as the timeframe, this will show how terrorism and the advancement of 
technology within law has adapted to change the viewpoint on intrusion and privacy of an 
individual. By beginning with the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, ending with the 
Investigatory Powers Act will show how that during the timeframe the Governments 
viewpoint on privacy has changed, resulting in an Orwellian and intrusive state that 
monitors everyone66. If a piece of legislation is found to be unlawful, incompatible, or 
intrusive then the need to assess what has happened when reforming the Act will show the 
progression and change in privacy and intrusion rights throughout the years.  
This will conclude with a breakdown of the Investigatory Powers Act, while providing pros 
and cons of monitoring individuals to consider whether the Government abuses the powers 
given to itself. By then comparing this to the evidence shown within previous laws will give 
an impression whether the Government is considering the privacy lives of individuals, or 
whether this has been ignored for the purposes of collecting data and countering serious 
crime and terrorism. This will also show whether serious or minor crimes are reviewed, to 
show whether the Government is complying with its own laws, to show whether law 
enforcement have too much power, and instead to consider whether an independent 
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organisation needs to take this sector away from public, and to an extent Government 
control. 
Black Letter Law 
By reviewing the legal implications of privacy and intrusion within cases and legislation will 
show where laws have misplaced the balance between intrusion and privacy rights. By 
reviewing the previous laws and Investigatory Powers Act will show whether there is an 
intrusion of privacy. The powers within the Act can then show where powers have been 
abused, which have intruded on individual rights. Black letter law is normally used within 
legal dissertations as the method is used to collaborate, describe, and use legal rules to offer 
a significant look on legal authority’s commentary. This is because it refers to the basic 
standard elements/principles of laws which are free from reasonable dispute. As this 
dissertation refers to the privacy rights of individuals, which are being intruded upon – it is 
only reasonable to review legislation, and its failings known to Parliament, to help with the 
future progress of new legislation. 
This will give clarity to the legislation used, while offering commentary on the significance 
and impact of authoritative legislative stances.  By using case law, statutes and academic 
commentary will then show where cases have been affected by privacy, the legislation 
affecting privacy and how powers are used to intrude on individuals. By reviewing how 
other critics have viewed the laws/cases to see if they also follow the same pathway that 
legislation and cases have gone. This has been criticised, and agreed to in Chapter 3 by 
others within the literature reviews, however by using laws and Acts that surround privacy 
will question whether the balance of power has been misused by the Government. 
Socio-Legal Perspective 
   
By using the literature review to show that authors are concerned about the privacy of 
individuals in the UK will enhance the argument that more privacy rights are needed on 
phones and the internet. By then using the data found within the research study will give an 
impression on society’s viewpoint regarding privacy and the debate of information being 
taken and used.  
By using a socio-legal approach, the assessment between the law and society, will look out 
how laws impact empirical knowledge and understanding of how laws and legal proceedings 
are affecting the privacy rights of individuals67. When putting this into context of their 
privacy and the idea that this is intruded upon, the 100% feedback received within the 
research study gives a clear indication that members of society want to discuss their privacy 
and the idea that their information is being viewed – because it violates everyone’s right to 
a private life. The need for a small section of society gives a clear impact on the statistics 
received68 to show that privacy lives of individuals are being intruded upon, and individuals 
would prefer that this is used for terrorism and serious crime, while also having their data 
withheld from law enforcement. This is where striking the balance is most difficult, because 
individuals would like to be protected, while also believing they should not be monitored 
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Study 
The study conducted for the purposes of this dissertation was questionnaires given to law 
students within Canterbury Christ Church University. The data received reviewed 
participants views towards privacy, and the possibility of this being breached by allowing 
the Government to view their data, while analysing what they would allow the Government 
to store information on.  
The need to assess students was due to the ease of accessing the students and their 
understanding of changes in law. Each student has a basic understanding of privacy 
legislation, due to the modules they study at Canterbury Christ Church University, while 
members of society may not understand legislation as easily. The public may also have been 
harder to source, as their answers may be deemed private and confidential, whereas the 
students used knew that the study was important to assess how they view personal 
sensitive information. In a continuously growing digital world, students understand the need 
for passwords, confidentiality and the threats that could appear online, which is precisely 
why they were used – because they know the technology.   
The participants have the ability to assess what they believe is right, while understanding of 
legal implications. When combining this with the socio-legal perspective of being law 
students and members of society where the Government is taking their information, storing 
data, and then using should show an understanding and willingness to show what they 
believed to be intrusion of power by the Government.   
The use of questionnaires was to ensure a direct answer was shown in the form of closed 
questions, which means students then have the choice to pick an answer they believe is 
most important. Although this limited the responses individuals could give, the quantitative 
   
data will show how as a collective group the need for privacy rights is so necessary in 
today’s world, where the idea that personal sensitive information can be taken has brought 
fear to individuals, shown within the statistics. Other questions within the study review the 
Governments power, and the possibility of another organisation having this power, instead 
of the Government. This will then directly relate to the Investigatory Powers Act that gives 
power to the Government and its agencies to deter crime. The idea that this may no longer 
be accepted within society could be the outcome of the results, which will then give a 
response to whether as a collective society they believe the balance of intrusion and privacy 
is met. 
Interviews and focus groups were considered but not used within this study, as individual 
responses were needed to give focused responses, rather than allow results to be 
misconstrued or be deemed as bias69. The use of questionnaires allowed open and closed 
questions, with a quick response from participants and the ability to process and formulate 
the data to ensure the smallest period – allowing the data to be analysed as much as 
possible afterwards70. The qualitative data has also been discussed in terms of the literature 
review giving, which has given an interpretation to what authors believe to be intrusive and 
what needs to be private71. By using quantitative numerical data allows this study to have a 
triangulation methodology, by allowing; qualitative evidence from the literature reviews, 
which are combined with the black letter and historical stance from legislation, with a 
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quantitative study from a socio-legal perspective – empowering the argument for more 
privacy rights72.  
As the Investigatory Powers Act is something individuals will not have read, the use of 
questionnaires makes it particularly easy to form a question for participants to answer, 
which will then be directly relevant to something they have not read. This is also applicable 
for intrusion and privacy aspects. However, each individual does have an idea of what they 
find intrusive and what should be considered as private, and it is interesting to analyse as a 
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4 - Previous Legislation and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
The purpose of this chapter is to show a historical position on how previous legislation has 
impacted and changed to become newer law. Legislation was changed/reformed due to the 
impact previous Acts had on individuals. When members of society are mistreated or their 
rights abused, a claim is made and as such the Government acts accordingly to ensure this is 
prevented in the future (through the form of review and reform)73. This means that 
legislation that was created originally is not necessarily correct or morally right, which is why 
the Government have to review and reform laws. By beginning at the Regulation of the 
Investigatory Powers Act74, to then progress to the Investigatory Powers Act through only a 
few pieces of legislation will show where the Acts have had problems/discrepancies and 
how this has reformed to become the next piece of law. The Acts all have elements of 
privacy and intrusion rights that have been abused or misused, showing where the 
Government has previously failed, while also showing the need for reform. By analysing 
previous cases which involve the intrusion of privacy rights enhances the argument that the 
Government has been abusing the powers given, to then assess whether similar 
inconsistencies within the recent Investigatory Powers Act75. This will also give a perspective 
on whether using stored information is a positive or negative aspect, as examples will show 
that sometimes the Government agencies get cases wrong, and fail to recognise their own 
flaws. The chronological aspect is then clear as it shows the evolution of legislation involving 
privacy and intrusion, through the Acts specified to become the Investigatory Powers Act. 
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Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
The Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act76 was originally introduced to regulate 
communications that needed to be intercepted. This was to account for the technological 
change within the UK, such as the growth of the internet and stronger encryption methods 
used. The purpose of the Act is to enable access to mass communication through 
surveillance for Internet Service Providers. This is done through facilities put in place, while 
an individual protects individual information and continue to monitor internet activity. The 
need for this Act to be rushed through Parliament was to help critics, who believed that 
terrorism, internet crime and paedophilia were occurring regularly. 
Part I77 allows the interception and collection of communications data. Secondly, Part II78 
allows the covert use of surveillance by authorities, regulated through intelligence 
techniques and safeguards for the public against unnecessary and disproportionate 
invasions of privacy. Lastly, Part III79 allows the law enforcement agencies to require the 
disclosure of protected encrypted data, which includes encryption keys and passwords. 
With these three sections shows that the Government originally wanted to protect privacy 
rights, while also realising the need to invade individual’s private lives to counter and deter 
serious crime and terrorism. However, it has been suggested that local authorities have 
been misusing and abusing these powers80, even though the legislation has been trying to 
counter this – showing the need for the Government to readdress the imbalance of privacy 
and intrusion. 
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Abu Bakar Munir et al explained that the powers within RIPA81 increased communication 
surveillance, while weakening data protection to ensure increased data sharing and profiling 
of individuals occurred. The purpose for the RIPA regulations was to intercept 
communications and the disclosure of data, while carrying out covert surveillance on 
electronically password protected data. This was done by ensuring Internet Service 
Providers accessed customer’s communications secretly. This enabled a mass amount of 
surveillance, which would then continuously be monitored to prevent serious crime and 
terrorism.  
The review committee of the Act explained that Parliament rushed through legislation due 
to the fear element of terrorism, with little debate to counter any further criminal actions. 
The lack of debate within Parliament over the powers that can be used have led to local 
authorities misusing its mechanisms for its own self gain. Rt Hon Keith Vaz has highlighted 
that there is a concern over “petty and vindictive” abuse and misuse of the Act, while Brian 
Binley has explained that local councils need to stop using the Act as a tool. Recent 
examples, such as the prosecution of Journalists within ‘Plebgate’ and Chris Huhne head led 
to the belief that the Act identifies individuals, breaking privacy laws, while also perverting 
the course of justice. This shows that the laws used within the UK that were created at the 
beginning of technological advancements broke privacy rights, and the balance between 
intrusions has not been met.  
Critics82 have speculated that the Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act Regulations 
were excessive and a threat to civil liberties. Big Brother Watch published a report in 201083 
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that reviewed the improper use of RIPA within local councils. This relates back to Poole 
Council84 where privacy lives were intruded upon to check whether children were in the 
correct catchment areas. Jenny Paton is one case based on catchment areas, where she was 
wrongly suspected of lying about her address. Paton’s telephone billing records were 
covertly assessed over a three-week period, while her car and children were also targeted to 
show the families movements. Although what they did is still considered legal, the privacy 
implications are clear to show that minors and citizens have been wrongly accused. This 
means the RIPA regulations needed to be reformed to meet the requirement within the Act, 
that serious crimes and terrorism acts needed to be watched, rather than a minor or 
wrongfully accused crime. This relates back to what should be private, and what is 
considered as intrusive, as it is clear in this specific case that the Government were invading 
the family’s private lives. 
Research suggests that 372 local authorities used the RIPA powers, and 8,575 cases were 
made in two years85. Each council carried out 11 operations each day for two years to 
monitor individuals. Within these cases, only 4.5% were prosecuted, with a majority 
concluding with the case being discontinued or finding that individuals were entirely 
innocent. This suggests that perhaps the need for local authorities to have powers to 
monitor individual’s privacy lives is too extreme, due to the fact a small amount has a 
successful conviction. This also shows when assessing privacy rights and the intrusion 
involved within RIPA’s powers, the balance between both have not been met, and instead 
individual’s lives were previously abused and powers misused.  
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Other crimes being reviewed include: smoking bans, fly tipping and dog fouling. Although 
this does break the law, to compare this to terrorism and serious crime and justify the need 
to monitor individuals is difficult to comprehend86. Similarly, authorities have monitored 
their own employees to see whether they are; lying about their car parking, working at the 
correct times, assess sick pay, and spy on wardens who are employed to spot crime. Private 
sector companies do not have these powers, and for the public authorities to review its 
employees shows that the responsibility of powers has been broken. Within RIPA 
regulations entrusts users to be capable, and to have authorities misuse these controls in 
the context of employment disputes is concerning. 
The Government have argued that by using RIPA powers will catch someone doing 
something but fails to address the type of society it wants citizens to belong within87. 
Although by using powers allows crime and disorder to be met, this is considered as 
disproportionate and illiberal as intrusive powers are used by the council, which seem 
unnecessary for the goal the Government wishes to achieve. Another argument would be 
that even when investigations into individuals are warranted, the surveillance methods used 
today are unnecessary – and that there is a simpler approach when reviewing individuals, 
such as asking. A final thought would be that some councils have managed without the 
powers, and instead of covertly intruding upon individuals privacy lives, they are overtly told 
that tape recordings will be made. This shows that although this still is intrusive, individuals 
are notified and informed that after several letters regarding an issue, then they will be 
monitored by councils. This questions whether it is right to use surveillance methods on 
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individuals covertly, when Councils like Bradford – who use overt methods, gain a 
proportional outcome while protecting the privacy rights of individuals.  
Proposals were made for RIPA, to try to balance the privacy and intrusion aspects. Firstly, 
the report suggested that no Council should have the powers within the Act, explaining that 
if alleged wrongdoing is serious enough then covert surveillance should be used by the 
police. This would be in cases of serious crime and terrorism, rather than dog fouling or 
littering. It is clear here that powers have been misused, and that Councils use them purely 
for because they are there. This is violating the privacy lives of individuals, for crimes that do 
not warrant a good enough explanation for abuses into the lives of citizens. The second 
proposal, failing removing powers is to permit RIPA powers with a warrant obtained by the 
Magistrates’ Court for serious crimes only. This would allow powers to be used 
proportionally and reasonably in order to protect individuals, and their privacy rights. The 
problem here is that Councils have been told numerously to stop using RIPA powers but 
continue to do so. Finally, victims being monitored should be notified if found innocent, to 
explain why they were being watched. This would change the culture around oppressive 
powers, as those using such extreme methods had to also be held accountable to the 
victims being monitored.  
 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 200188 was introduced as an emergency step 
following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, September 11th 200189. The aim 
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was for the Government to implement this to try to combat any immediate threat the UK 
could face at that specific time. The Act was highly criticised due to the speed and lack of 
parliamentary review, which led to its initial review in 200290. The need for this to be 
assessed was because of the intrusion on individual’s privacy and liberty, as the powers set 
out within the Act allowed the Government to extensively review phone, internet and billing 
information. The 2002 report91 has made various comments regarding the threat to privacy 
lives, and the intrusion innocent individuals have on their lifestyle when the justification to 
counter terrorism, by using their data, is not clear.  
The Terrorism Order 2006 and 2009  
The Terrorism Order92, replaces the 2006 order93 that was deemed to be a threat to rights, 
explains that ‘terrorism’ “is the use or threat or Action to influence the government to 
intimidate the public”94 and “to use or threat to advance a political, religious, racial or 
ideological cause”95. These uses or threats can be defined as “serious violence against a 
person… involving serious damage to property… endangering a person’s life… creating a 
serious risk to the safety of the public… or… to seriously interfere or severely disrupt an 
electronic system”96. Actions referred to within the Act also include explosives97, used as a 
threat or Action as mentioned above as a threat to the state. The Treasury must be made 
aware of any relevant person or suspect in association with terrorism, who has committed 
an offence or is a restricted person98. The institution informing the state must make the 
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Treasury aware of information based on the suspicion99, the person, the nature and quantity 
of any resources held for the relevant person for up to five years to relevant direction being 
given100. The term “reasonable grounds for suspecting”101 is also difficult to interpret as it 
could be direct or indirect, acting alone or on behalf of somebody and designations imparts 
onerous regime on those selected. Only a designated person may deal with funds or 
resources belonging or owned by a person referred to within the 2006 order102, unless 
under licence granted by the Treasury. In one key case where the Treasury acted on these 
issues was with regards to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and other individuals, 
who had a list of criteria to ensure that on “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that a 
person or group of people were terrorists. The issues however within HM Treasury v A103 
was whether the Treasury or Executive, were empowered by the Act to allow introductions 
of terrorism orders or Al-Qaida orders by the Order in Council104. The contention of orders 
was ultra vires on three grounds; one being they passed into effect without parliamentary 
scrutiny, second the lack of legal certainty and proportionality, and lastly that there was no 
procedure available to allow any challenge. From a fundamental rights perspective, the 
orders were incompatible with Article 8(13)105 and Article 1 of Protocol 1(14)106 of the ECHR.  
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The Counter Terrorism Act 2008 
The Counter Terrorism Act107 was passed to increase police powers for countering terrorism. 
The main sections that need to be noted are; longer terrorism sentences, registering and 
monitoring those convicted for terrorism related offences, changes to rules surrounding the 
use of intercepting evidence, powers to seize the assets of convicted terrorists and the 
removal of documents from a property search to decide whether they need to be legally 
seized as part of an investigation. The 42-day terrorist detention without charge order was 
abandoned, which was previously 90 days, due to a single vote108. Although this was 
discussed and voted on heavily, the government believed that a Counter-Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Bill109 should be drafted to ensure any other form of terrorism that 
suddenly arose could be countered with this specific bill if needed in an emergency. 
Draft Data Communications Bill 2012/The Snoopers’ Charter 
The bill was created to ensure communications data was obtained by public authorities. The 
bill replaced parts of RIPA110, ACTSA111 and the Data Retention Regulations 2009112. This was 
proposed by the Home Secretary in 2012113, and required Internet Service Providers and 
phone companies to hold records of all its users Internet history, social media, emails, voice 
calls, gaming history and messaging history to be stored with the service providers for 12 
months. The bill was expected to be brought into legislation by 2014, but the former Deputy 
Prime Minister114 withdrew support in 2013, forcing his party to block the legislation from 
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being reintroduced. The government then reintroduced the bill in the form of the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill115, but with more limited powers and additional oversight.  
RIPA116, being the original bill, gave Data Collection powers to Communication Service 
Providers117 to collect and retain information about their uses, while under the Draft 
Communication bill allowed any organisation to interact with users and produce or transmit 
electronic communication to collect and retain information, regardless of its relevance to 
the business/user. The technique used is known as Deep Packet Inspection, which are the 
black boxes discussed later, to probe when Communication Service Providers refuse to 
submit data. The bill discussed later within this chapter will try to enforce CSP and ISP’s to 
store data and give data when the government requires it. The filtering arrangements have 
not completely been discussed, allowing honeypots for casual hackers, blackmailers, 
criminals and foreign states to seize giant databases due to the broadly worded and poorly 
drafted provisions.  
The powers within the Bill were to change the way institutions accessed communications 
traffic data, under the Interception Modernisation Programme. The programme was a 
government initiative to extend the capabilities of lawful interception and storage of 
communications data, eventually leading to storing details of all UK communications data in 
a central database, similar to the National Security Agency Call Database. The main 
principles were to collect data on calls, emails, chatroom discussions and web-browsing 
history habits, requiring the insertion of black box probes into the UK’s compute and 
telephone networks. Huhne explained that the “Orwellian plans” to view private 
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communications were “deeply worrying”118. The Home Secretary119 in 2009 suggested that 
there were no plans to create a “single central store”120 for data, suggesting that the 
government’s stance on keeping all data together had changed. The current plans are to 
involve Internet Service Providers to spend £2 billion on deep packet inspection equipment 
within their own networks, forcing them to work with the government to perform the cross-
correlation and profiling their users’ behaviour themselves, meaning the original 
programme is still achieving its goals, but not in the original plans suggested.  
 This was not a firm legislative format and was opposed by the opposition. The coalition 
agreement ended storing email and internet data without good reason. The coalition also 
reviewed the problems with the Interception Modernisation Programme and the access to 
communication and have since created the Communications Capabilities Development 
Programme as a modified and up to date format of the Interception Modernisation 
Programme. 
The Communications Capabilities Development Programme121 has extended the lawful 
interception and storage of communications data, involving logging of every phone call, 
email, text message between all inhabitants in the UK, but would not keep records of 
emails, and is trying to extend the realms of telecommunications to log communications 
within social media networking platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. The aims were to 
pursue terrorist attacks, prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, 
strengthening protection against a terrorist attack and prepare to mitigate the impact of a 
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terrorist attack. The CONTEST122 document has stated that a change in privacy laws are 
needed for the CCPD to be completely legal.  
Several issues with these programmes, which causes controversy when applying legislation, 
such as the Draft Communications Data Bill123, as it allows “investigators the potential to 
identify other forensic opportunities, identify witnesses and premises of evidential 
interest”124, meaning government officials could use this as a “fishing expedition”125 if the 
cost was to be lowered. Secondly, to give government agencies power to review 
communications traffic data needs oversight of data collection and processing. This means 
control of data will be difficult without an external company auditing the way data is 
gathered, and viewing the operations that RIPA126 and the Data Protection Act127 comply 
with. It also further brings whether the auditors, people using the powers, or any other 
person involved are the right people to manage all private information. It is unclear how 
data is regulated, suggestions of a judge-given warrant or senior official would be enough to 
review basic data sessions. The RIPA128 powers have already been abused by government 
agencies, so to give new legislation and powers could be a possible bad thing, as once again 
is the person using these powers the right person, or should it be another. A fourth 
consequence would be the cost, of an excess of £1 billion after Communication Service 
Providers129 and Internet Service Providers implement and install systems to conform to 
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government legislation. The feasibility and cost was made clear in 2009, and reiterated in 
2010130, by the Information Commissioner that it was too much, and was abandoned the 
estimate and refused to put a price on the programmes.  
Personal data is another big problem as there are problems with cyberterrorists, who go 
online to destroy systems and mechanisms, and “insider threats”131 who are either corrupt 
or incompetent, putting the risk of vulnerable people such as those fleeing abusive 
relationships at a greater risk of harm. The government had commented that highly 
confidential details will be safe, however with such a huge system, if an “insider threats”132 
was to pursue and take information, they would be able to.  EU Law then has its final say to 
discuss that privacy is a Human Right and that the programmes would be violating these 
protections due to the proposed collection and storage of data, meaning the 
Communications Data Bill133 is incompatible with EU law, regardless of the Home Office 
assuring that the programmes and bill would be compatible. The Article 29 Working Party 
issued a report in July 2010 to134 question if EU Law should stop member states from issuing 
further legislation that went above and beyond the current EU data retention laws135, and 
that data retention period should be shorter than the suggested 24 months.  
Returning to the legislation, it is clear with the concerns stated above that the law could 
never could deal with the huge power, invasion of privacy, less encryption, the cyber risks, 
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costs, burden of ISP’s and CPS’s would make the bill difficult to bring into power. The need 
to review this bill is so that the public do not lose their privacy it is the most important 
aspect within these recommendations suggested to the government. Alongside this, to then 
scrap the idea and move onto the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill136, which gives more 
power and more privacy rights seems problematic and unlikely.  
Data Retention and the Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act137 was enacted in response to a 
declaration of invalidity made by the COJ regarding the retention of certain communications 
data, which has now amended the 2000 Act138. Powers for retention of communication now 
belong with the Secretary of State who is to issue a retention notice to public 
telecommunications operators to retain relevant communications data if necessary and 
proportionate for the integrity, security and protection of data. This must be kept for 12 
months, and cannot be exceeded, as stated within the ACTSA139. The relevant 
communications can be regarded as any telephony data stored in the UK or any internet 
data logged within the UK, meaning that any form of threat to national security could 
compromise an individual’s rights if the state deems it necessary and proportionate with the 
Act. When considering how the UK spied on those families in Poole, it questions whether 
this Act is also being followed by the state, and if so, by how much.  
The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
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Previous legislation therefore has created the Investigatory Powers Act140 which has become 
one of the most sweeping surveillance powers in the western world. The Act has three main 
roles; to analyse communications data to view who is in exchange with individuals and when, 
but not the content within the documents. Secondly, to intercept data to contain the actual 
content in messages, secret recordings of calls and to obtain words in an email. Lastly, the 
third power allows Government agencies to gather any type of online communication to deter 
serious crime and terrorism to protect the security of the nation.  
The need for this act is due to “modern communications… used by the unscrupulous… 
purposes ranging from cyber-attack, terrorism and espionage to fraud, kidnap and child 
sexual exploitation.”141 Due to constitutional, technological and issues of Human Rights, the 
Chair on Human Rights analysed this to explain that “The Bill provides a clear and transparent 
basis for powers already in use by the security and intelligence services, but there need to be 
further safeguards. Protection for MP communications from unjustified interference is vital, 
as it is for confidential communications between lawyers and clients, and for journalists’ 
sources, the Bill must provide tougher safeguards to ensure that the Government cannot 
abuse its powers to undermine Parliament’s ability to hold the Government to account.”142 
The Act allows a range of Government authorities to have access to internet connection 
records without a warrant, raising issues on who can see individual’s information. 
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A legal challenge was made demanding the law be repealed as over 200,000 signatures143 
voted against the act144, forcing Parliament to debate the Act. The issue was that internet 
providers are required to store customers’ web history for 12 months and make the records 
accessible to Government agencies. Snowden, whistle blower on surveillance programmes 
explained the act was “the most extreme surveillance in the history of western democracy. It 
goes farther than many autocracies.”145 Snowden wrote this because the Act requires 
companies to break encryption, even though big companies such as Google, Apple and 
Facebook have argued this is “hazy”146 and close to breaking privacy laws. 
Technology companies are being forced to store information, meaning individuals are 
constantly being monitored, while their information is being stored in a massive bulk 
database. Security agencies have therefore, raised fears that companies’ databases could be 
intercepted by hackers, which can potentially happen. This is due to a weakening in citizens’ 
encryption activities to allow Government agencies to be able to intercept, decipher and 
monitor individual’s information, set out in the Investigatory Powers Act147. With a lack of 
backlash over the Investigatory Powers Act148, Internet Service Providers will be logging web 
browser information constantly. The main issue now is what is to stop an MP or a Government 
agency from using backdoor methods to find information on individuals. Plainly, the answer 
is clear, possibly a few years with an Investigatory Powers Commissioner delaying the powers 
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if appealed, but ultimately none. What brings a scarier thought to mind is when will big 
companies such as Twitter, Facebook, Google, or Apple be forced to introduce backdoor 
procedures or be required to hand over user data.  
Although the information being stored to look at is to check whether an individual is a threat 
to national security, all individual’s information is now able to be reviewed with backdoor 
encryption methods, causing a contrast to data protection and privacy laws for the purposes 
of deterring terrorism. This was also done in previous laws, one specifically being Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act149 that was hurried through parliament and was 
incompatible with the Human Rights Act150 and the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department151. The High Court found sections 
1152 and 2153 of the Act to be unlawful, ordering the sections to be dis-applied, making it 
compatible with EU law. When considering this law, this has already been deemed illegal by 
the European Court of Justice because it allows “general and indiscriminate”154 retention of 
electronic data. Liberty, a Human Rights campaigning group have commented explaining that 
although the country voted for ‘Brexit’ this should not impact the privacy and security of 
individuals. Although EU law will still be enforced for several years after Brexit, Parliament 
can then choose what needs to be removed. This means data protection or privacy rights 
could soon become extinct, allowing further surveillance laws to invade the rights of 
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individuals further, showing the argument of the Orwellian state155 being more apparent than 
ever to modern society. 
Returning to the Investigatory Powers Act156, there has been a public debate regarding the 
mass intrusive powers to agencies to gain targeted information as part of investigations157. 
The Home Office has insisted that this will be compatible with European Convention on 
Human Rights158, however the Act has questioned to have issued with privacy rights. With 
pressure from politicians and judicial power, overseas organisations like Google and Facebook 
may have to release information annually, allowing “convenient silence… 500,000 times a 
year that communications data, such as call records, is tapped without any warrant at all”. 
This bulk harvesting of data reviews traces left online, which has the power to “dissolve the 
very idea of privacy”. The US a similar ideology has been cast with Obamas surveillance panel 
doubting the “presumption that extra data would beget extra security, and the federal courts 
have ruled against bulk collection.” What is being questioned is if extra intelligence gains are 
worth the privacy lost159 as David Anderson insists on a more “detailed operational case”160 
needs creating for surveillance in comparison to privacy and data protection. 
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Conclusion 
Surveillance is still today as apparent as it always has been. With global issues such as 
Russia161, ISIS162, North Korea163 and the growing diplomatic problems between various 
states, not only is terrorism a threat but now a newer concept known as cyberterrorism has 
begun to infect the globe. The need for surveillance within the UK specifically is clear. With 
the recent London terror attacks164 and attacks in Germany165, the need to have alliances to 
combat and deter both types of terror threats are necessary. With the recent Investigatory 
Powers Act166, this should be achieved with the powers granted to Government agencies to 
be able to investigate and store data, with the intention to be a better piece of legislation in 
comparison to its illegal and unlawful predecessors. The aim is to deter terrorism and serious 
crime, and although it is not possible to assess whether this is achieving its goals due to it only 
recently becoming legislation, the need to review this piece of legislation in the future is 
apparent.  
The Government have tried to create this to deter terror and criminal actions through a 
surveillance method that is correct and lawful, and for the interest of the nation as a priority. 
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However, due to the previous laws the future question for another paper is to assess whether 
this act is legal, proportionate and compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights 
or, if the UK leave the EU, a British Human Rights. When these future issues arise in the form 
of future cases or enquiries, it is for the Government to act accordingly, and to show that 
although the Act is considered “the most extreme surveillance in the history of western 
democracy”167, that there is a transparent, efficient, and lawful review system and procedure.  
This clearly does impact privacy, data protection and personal sensitive information, invading 
the lives of individuals every day. The difference here is for society to assess whether this 
protects the interests of the nation, or whether there is a need to protect privacy rights. 
Necessity to ensure the rights of society over the insurance of individual rights has been 
analysed by critics, and it would appear there is a need for more privacy rights for individuals, 
especially “MP’s, journalists, and trade unionists”168. With the rise of terrorist threats over 
the last decade, shown through the recent NHS attacks169, it is clear the need to combat this 
to ensure protection of personal sensitive data is done. This could be done through not 
allowing data retention, which would therefore not allow Government agencies to review 
potential criminal and terrorist movements. An alternative is an opt out scheme by individuals 
with the right to be forgotten170 by allowing the control of users’ information to be removed 
online171. This could be difficult to remove everything, but removing social media information, 
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which arguably holds more information about a user as the individual is constantly using it 
by; updating your life, adding pictures, putting information on which could be considered 
personal. One method journalists are returning to using are pen and paper, as previous 
methods are less traceable than online, which is constantly surveying society. A final thought 
is for Government action to increase spending on security to ensure viruses, malware, and 
the software to ensure cyber terrorism does not become a greater threat.  
When reviewing data protection, surveillance is becoming a greater threat due to two 
reasons; one being the lack of protection for individuals, and the second being the problem 
that with the recent surveillance laws, the backdoor encryption methods to gain access to 
individuals’ information is vulnerable to hackers. The lack of privacy for personal information 
is an issue which could, arguably, be a threat to the fundamental rights of individuals’ 
freedoms. The storage of data also needs to be upgraded to allow less threats to penetrate 
security as the big companies are being attacked, and personal sensitive data is being taken. 
Data mining and big data could therefore be argued on both sides as it is good to ensure that 
criminal actions are countered, but on the other side shows a lack of privacy and the 
possibility of hackers against big companies taking individuals data. Data protection clearly is 
inadequate in a world where data is constantly exchanged around the globe, and critics have 
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5 – Findings 
This chapter reviews the study conducted at Canterbury Christ Church University in the form 
of questionnaires to law students. The study was conducted fairly and without bias, to 
gather effective results from individuals. The response rate received was 100%, as all 
individuals who were asked completed the questionnaire form and returned this on the 
same day. Only 30 individuals were asked as the students were in the middle of their 
revision in preparation for exams. The class should have been larger, but some students 
opted not to join the revision session. 
The results found have been formulated on a table173 and the 30 responses were 
electronically entered into each form to ensure anonymity was ensured. As some questions 
had individual’s information, in regards to age and gender, the Data Protection Act warrants 
for the complete protection of participants. By electronically entering each individual’s data, 
and ensuring all data was correct by re-checking allowed for individuals to remain 
completely anonymous in a high profile topic. 
The data revealed in this dissertation is not the only pieces of information that can be 
extracted, and if at a later date this study was to be conducted again it may be interesting to 
see if any other data can be used. The statistics used will give an impression on how 
individuals feel regarding privacy, intrusion and their own personal sensitive information in 
a world where serious and minor crime, terrorism and the access of information is growing.  
By using questionnaires allowed for the use of open and closed questions where available. 
The focus was primarily based on closed questions to be able to quantify the data into 
statistics, rather than allow participants to express what they truly believed as this would 
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have given room for interpretation on their answers which could allow bias. Focus groups 
and interviews were not used within this study as quantitative data was needed, rather than 
qualitative, but have been noted as something to consider in any following works on privacy 
and intrusion. The questions asked were: 
1) How old are you? 
2) Are you male or female? 
3) Do you think the Government should be able to store information on individuals 
regarding you phone calls, messaging and internet history? 
4) When the Government having information (regarding your phone calls, messaging and 
internet history) on individuals make you feel safer against terrorism? 
5) Would the Government having information (regarding your phone calls, messaging and 
internet history) on individuals make you feel safer against serious crime, minor crimes or 
both? 
6) Do you want your information (regarding your phone calls, messaging and internet 
history) to be stored and used by the Government for 12 months? 
7) Do you think someone needs to be appointed to decide/ assess when public authorities 
should further investigate an individuals’ data? 
8) Who should this be? 
9) Should the Government share individual’s data with other countries?  
 
Results 
Participants were completely split on whether the Government store an individual’s 
information, with a majority of males wanting independence from the authorities, while a 
majority of females were more open to the idea of the agencies storing information.  
   
 
Here it is clear that females were open to agencies having access to data. When also using 
age as a comparison, younger people prefer to have more privacy rather than the older age 
groups. This shows that the younger generation, the individuals growing up with the newer 
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Participants that voted yes for storing 
information against terrorism
   
Most individuals answered that if they had to, they would allow the Government access to 
their data for the purposes of serious crime.  
 
Here it is clear, that individuals prefer the legislation that explains that powers are used for 
serious crime and terrorism, making the Government compliant with the standards 
individuals have set out. When reviewing the minority, they all reported that they would 
feel more comfortable having both serious and minor crimes to be monitored. It could be 
argued that there is some crimes which are in the middle between both spectrums, and 
individuals feel that they need to be reviewed too.  
A large majority wanted an independent organisation to ensure powers were correctly used 
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The evidence here is clear that individuals may feel that the Government has currently too 
much power, and the need to have an independent organisation allows responsibility of 
holding information, while ensuring that a company would have to be held accountable to 
the Government. Currently, the agencies are self-accountable meaning that individuals may 
question how powers are used correctly. It shows that in the past, the Government has 
misused and abused legislation as they do not have an organisation to account to. The 
concern shows the need for this dissertation, to question whether the Government will use 
legislation and powers to ensure privacy and intrusion rights are used proportionally and 
not against the law.  
Future studies 
if in the future a study was to be conducted based on the evidence shown above, it would 
be interesting to find out the ethnicity of individuals and how they feel about the same 
subject, as white, black or Asian orientation may have different perspectives on privacy, 










Who should store individual data?
   
At this point there would be new privacy/intrusion laws that may be the newest scandal, so 
whoever may be conducting the study may want to give a brief underpinning of new 
legislation to participants, and then give them a similar questionnaire based off of their 
thoughts of the new law.  
By using focus groups, interviews or even more open ended questions allow participants to 
be more analytical about their answers, which may result in a better study. The purpose of 
questionnaires was to gain statistics within this dissertation, while a focus in the future 
could be on how media officials, journalists or whistle-blowers view certain laws. Already 
Edward Snowden has given his interpretation towards the Investigatory Powers Act, 
meaning more high ranking individuals who give a qualitative answer may make the study 
more substantial. 
As a final example, by breaking the age groups down further to give a better understanding 
of whether it is a specific set of ages that oppose/prefer the legislation to allow data storage 
and usage. Within the questionnaire set out within this study, three age brackets were used 
to show a difference in thought.  
Conclusion  
To conclude the findings within the study clearly answer some research objectives, while 
also giving an understanding into the research question: 
- Is there a need to reform the current system in place to allow an independent 
organisation to have control over powers? 
Here, it is clear that individuals feel that powers the Government have should belong with 
an organisation. This does not mean to say individuals feel that the Government is doing 
   
a bad job, rather that the most preferred choice is with an Independent organisation that 
the Government will  be more duty bound to uphold to the law on data storage and usage. 
Currently the Government is self-analysing its own performance, and the question gives 
rise as to whether it should. The problem here is that if the Government could make a 
wrong decision the public may not find out until an enquiry is made. Whereas if an 
independent organisation was to make the same decision, this would either be leaked or 
found out, making the Government imposes fines and possible imprisonment for 
potential breaches of law.  
It would be interesting to find out, a few years after the Investigatory Powers Act as to 
whether individuals prefer an independent organisation more, or whether agencies and 
the Government should still hold the powers to store and use personal sensitive 
information. Following Snowden’s comments regarding the laws extensive privacy 
breaches, it appears that by allowing the Government to have this much authority allows 
for the dystopian state to become increasingly more surveillance based against the public 
in an Orwell type system. 
- Should minor crimes be monitored? 
Currently the law dictates that only serious crime and terrorism is to be focused on by the 
Government and its agencies. Within this study participants feel the same in regards to this, 
in the sense that a majority of individuals were happy to allow data storage for purposes of 
terrorism, while another majority believed serious crime was something to be monitored. It 
should be worth noting here that a proportion of individuals also felt that minor crimes 
should be monitored too, which in the future the Government may need to review. The 
   
concern here is the Orwell type system is getting dangerously closer to being reality rather 
than fantasy. 
Two of three research objectives here have been met, and should in the future be reviewed 
to compare whether the public adopt the same approach to the idea of data storage and 
use. When finally reviewing the research question, whether individuals felt that the 
Government have too much power, it could be considered within the question regarding an 
independent organisation that participants have already answered this. If they felt that the 
Government had a fair and proportionate amount of power, while they act based on 
necessity rather than storing mass amounts of data for an amount of time, then there would 
be no need for an independent organisation to take control. The idea of giving an 
independent organisation the powers is to ensure that agencies and authorities do not hold 
all control over individuals, when currently they do. Here it could be arguable to consider 
whether the research question has been met to assess if privacy and intrusion has met a 
balance, but to say that the Government has too much power could show that currently the 









   
6 - Conclusion and Recommendations  
The purpose of this dissertation was to assess the Investigatory Powers Act and previous 
legislation surrounding privacy and intrusion rights, to assess the balance between the two 
aspects through the use of literature reviews, legislation and throughout questionnaires.   
The Investigatory Powers Act has been created to “investigate, prevent and supress 
terrorism” due to the rise of terrorist threats. The United Kingdom has responded by 
implementing legislation, to attempt to try to deter crime and terrorism. This was done with 
the first pieces of legislation, the Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act to the 
Investigatory Powers Act. The implications were privacy and intrusion based, specifically 
with communications data on technology. The powers set out within the new Act have 
allowed the Government to investigate data of individuals.  
Although this is intrusive, it is justifiable and warranted to prevent terrorism, whereas it is 
unwarranted to allow individuals to be branded as criminals. The Act, and previous 
legislation is leading members of society to assume that they are potential criminals, 
because they are being treated the exact same. The requirement to assess is there is a need 
for legislation review is clear, as even now Members of Parliament are going through the 
Court system to give more privacy rights for individuals. Previous legislation has suggested 
that Human Rights is being abused, and that the UK Government is going beyond their 
powers.  
The idea that the Government is becoming a dystopian surveillance state, suggested by 
Orwell does show that there was a need to assess legislation to make a proportional 
balanced argument for both acquiring individual information, while also ensuring privacy 
rights are maintained. Although the need for privacy rights is necessary, all legislation 
reviewed relates to how rights are intruded upon, and how the Government is trying to 
   
justify their abuse of powers by using terrorism on a wide scale to ensure data is collected. 
Although newer forms of terrorism have been created (IE cyber terrorism), the Government 
are still accessing individuals information in non-terrorism related cases. This creates the 
argument of why individual’s details are being monitored and recorded when they are 
unrelated to terrorism, or have not committed a crime.  
Another aspect that needed to be considered is whether minor crimes should cause 
individuals information to be used. It appears that individuals are more willing to have their 
information used more for major crimes or terrorism than minor crime. This is due to the 
necessity aspect of what individuals are viewing for themselves. By using the powers within 
legislation to find minor crimes is unnecessary and unwarranted.  
Privacy and intrusion concerns remain one of the biggest concerns for some individual’s 
private lives, as whistle-blowers believe that the “the most extreme surveillance” has been 
introduced, and to monitor and review this further is needed to consider if abuses of privacy 
will occur more in the future. Currently, the Investigatory Powers Act is following previous 
legislation, and will use the powers given unnecessarily to force the privacy rights of 
individuals to be intruded on to try to counter terrorism. 
The Government have been able to self-assess its own agencies, and there clearly is a need 
for an independent organization to review when powers are used and abused. The use of a 
company performing this would enable the Government to ensure that they are correctly 
using the powers, while also allowing an external examiner to assess when powers are 
abused. The concern currently is that the Government is abusing powers, assessing them 
and when the media eventually finds out, sparks outrage and injustice due to potential bias. 
This would lead to completely impartial verdicts, rather than a self-analysis which causes 
fear of injustice.  
   
The Investigatory Powers Act has made it compulsory for Internet Service Providers to store 
individual’s information. The Government and its agencies can view information, and assess 
whether there is a potential or current threat to society and national security in the 
information they review. This creates the stigma of an individual being a potential criminal, 
and sparks concern of using technology as the Government are building a profile of society 
and branding them potential threats. The power the agencies currently have is too much, 
allowing personal sensitive data to be used by external threats, leading society to believe 
that an ‘Orwellian’ style state is needed and that all individuals should be spied on. 
Research objectives 
The objectives within this dissertation were to establish where previous laws failed, and 
show if the Investigatory Powers Act would have its powers abused. This was done by 
reviewing previous misuses of power, led by the collection and intrusion of individual’s 
personal sensitive information. This should establish whether privacy and intrusion are 
balanced, and if there is a need for a reform of the current system put in place. Although the 
Government can take and store information, privacy is breached, and has been in previous 
legislation, as the Governments have overused powers to monitor minor crimes, rather than 
deter terrorism and serious crimes. Legislation has been incorrectly used in the past, shown 
by the many cases being presented through the Court system involving Human Rights. The 
Government is continuing to collect information on a large scale, which allows the 
identification of individuals and their information to be invaded. The concern is that the 
Government has become a dystopian surveillance state, which allows society to be 
monitored, labelled as criminals, and waits for an individual to create an act (regardless of 
how small) and brand them as a criminal. Orwell’s demonstration of this clearly shows that 
the Governments approach needs reforming before it becomes obsessed with the idea of 
   
micromanaging individuals lives, to the point where they can spot an anomaly and assume a 
crime will occur (which is essentially being done). 
When reviewing privacy, it is clear the Human Rights Act appear to be ignored by the 
Government, to allow data to be collected. The abuse of privacy in the past has been clear, 
and the justification around the modern day (shown through the legislation and literature 
reviews) suggests that privacy may become obsolete as Governments try to counter 
terrorism and crime. The Investigatory Powers Act is only the newest piece of legislation 
that allows this, showing that the privacy lives of individuals have and will continue to be 
affected, and that the Government is more concerned on collecting data and using the 
information for its own purposes.  
Therefore, the Government should not have access to the amount of information currently 
accessed and monitored. The personal sensitive data is intended only for one person, and 
whom they wish to share this with, rather than having their rights violated to target criminal 
actions, especially minor crimes that are not warranted. By using all of societies information 
shows an unbalanced framework, rather than targeting associates of serious crime and 
terrorism.  
This dissertation has questioned the role of privacy in society, in a domain that is heavily 
monitored. The argument that individual privacy rights are being intruded upon to attempt 
to protect the interests of the nation is a reasonable request, if this is purely for the 
purposes of serious crime and terrorism. This has been assessed under a proportionate and 
necessity based situation for some students, as all members of society are not going to 
comment a serious crime or terrorism. However, there are extremists that will, and the 
need to monitor all individuals to deter this is key. It does not mean that minor crime should 
   
be monitored as this is something that is deemed to not be in proportion or even in the 
realm of necessity to have societies data recorded and used.  
The idea to some scholars is that privacy is becoming an obsolete feature in a rapidly 
advancing technological age, and the only way to keep individuals safe is to monitor 
behaviour and counter any form of crime. To a degree, this is true as the idea to remove all 
terrorism in the world would be key. However, is then allows the Governments to become 
too powerful and allows further room for misuse of power. 
When discussing intrusion, the Orwellian state is sprung to mind in several literature 
reviews, as a theme continuously mentioned throughout the reading of articles and 
journals. The fear Orwell presents is of a super state monitoring all individuals while 
invading their private lives. Privacy activists have begun to feel that their rights are being 
ignored, and it could be argued that the public could also think this in the future if further 
extreme legislation comes into force. Members of Parliament are beginning to question why 
the Government is allowing agencies to access powers within the Investigatory Powers Act, 
which allows the use of mass amounts of data that has been recorded. The concern here is 
that the Government has overstepped its obligations to ensure the nation is secure, to the 
point that it begins to question and analyse its own citizens. This has previously occurred 
within the Belmarsh case, and it could be argued that this will happen again.  
When using phones and the internet as an example, both are being increasingly used as the 
digital age is occurring. Information can be extracted and stored from multiple sources, 
regardless of how necessary it is. The Government is using the information to deter crime 
and terrorism, based on the information it collects, but brings into question when the 
Government should stop harvesting information. Privacy and intrusion are unbalanced, 
regardless of national security, and it will only be a matter of time until it is able to truly 
   
establish how far the Government has overstepped its powers with the Investigatory 
Powers Act. Proportionality and necessity have therefore been overlooked in a society that 
is continuing to grow technologically, and the Government is doing little to ensure the 
privacy rights of individuals are maintained, while the intrusion of data is expanding. 
Alternative Methodologies/ Recommendations 
One further methodology that could be used in a future study is a comparative approach 
relating to another country’s privacy laws. By reviewing the US, Asia or the EU’s approach 
could show a contrast of opinions between Governments, which could also show a change 
for legislation. If another country believes in privacy for individuals – and has lower crime or 
terrorist rates, then perhaps the UK should consider adopting a similar model to deterring 
these approaches. 
This will show the privacy rights citizens in another country have, and the possible violations 
of their rights, while considering how the citizens in the UK have a balance in comparison to 
those abroad. This approach could be the next step when assessing how privacy laws 
interact across borders with another country. Alternatively, the evidence found could 
indicate that the UK has better privacy rights for individuals, in comparison to other 
countries. An example would be that within the EU, data retention can be extended for up 
to 2 years. Although the UK is in the EU, they have opted for a reduced storage period, 
showing that other countries could be longer, and potentially violate more rights. 
Another approach would be to consider focus groups or interviews with specialists and 
members of the public to establish an emotive or literature based approach towards the 
qualitative methods. This would be able to establish, and give a more in-depth analysis 
   
rather than the statistical approach taken by the questionnaires used in the study. This 
would give further evidence of acceptance or rejection from the UK population. 
 It is necessary to conduct research in this field further, especially regarding the 
Investigatory Powers Act, as this is still new legislation. If this were to be conducted five 
years later, this would either prove or disprove the evidence in this dissertation to suggest 
that privacy rights are being abused, and that individuals’ lives are being intruded upon for 
data, rather than terrorism and serious crime. 
Another way of reviewing this in the future is to look at: tracking, CCTV, monitoring 
conversations with technology, watching individuals through cameras, and by tracking 
individual’s offline. As privacy and intrusion is so vast, it could be argued that this topic may 
never reach a result where the balance is truly struck, and instead newer and different 
technology and methods are brought in to be discussed whether they should be private, or 
open to the Government.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, it would appear at this current stage that previous legislation has been abused 
and could possibly in the future, shown through legal cases and commentary being 
presented by scholars and specialists (whistle-blowers, media, and officials within the 
surveillance spectrum). This has been reviewed, and the Government has implemented new 
legislation which should alter how the balance between privacy and intrusion is created. 
This was done by the Investigatory Powers Act, which could be argued that this still not has 
been achieved. It would appear, that even at the early stages there is a need for review, 
reform and change in the legislation that the UK population is being subjected to. The 
extent of this is that privacy rights are being abused, and some would consider this to 
   
become obsolete in the wake of an advancing technological age with newer ways to commit 
crimes and terrorism.  
Agreeably, information should be used to counter and deter terrorism and serious crimes, 
but should not for the smaller minor crimes that clearly have been previously used, and it is 
possible could be used again. The abuse of power used for this needs to be met with 
commentary from an independent source, away from the Government’s control to be able 
to establish a bias free and transparent decision on cases that need to be discussed. 
Currently, this is not happening, and it could be argued that this may not happen anytime 
soon as more pressing issues have entered the realm of politics (Brexit), which may alter the 
idea of privacy altogether (pending the Governments decisions. 
Therefore, it is necessary to review this again in the future, to consider whether the 
Government is going to abuse new legislation to force all crimes to be monitored, or 
whether there is a review of the current framework put in place to establish a balance, and 
more privacy rights for individuals. The purpose of privacy within a society is to be 
unidentified, and unfortunately in this instance currently in the UK this is not occurring, to 
the point where specialists, individuals, and whistle-blowers are considering returning to 
previous methods to communicate with individuals as it is less identifiable and traceable. 
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